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ENFORCING THE CLAWBACK PROVISION:
PREVENTING THE EVASION OF LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 954 OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
*

Terrance Gallogly
And even as we seek to revive this economy, it’s also incumbent
on us to rebuild it stronger than before. We don’t want an economy that has the same weaknesses that led to this crisis. And that
means addressing some of the underlying problems that led to
this turmoil and devastation in the first place. Now, one of the
most significant contributors to this recession was a financial crisis
as dire as any we’ve known in generations—at least since the ‘30s.
And that crisis was born of a failure of responsibility—from Wall
Street all the way to Washington—that brought down many of the
world’s largest financial firms and nearly dragged our economy
1
into a second Great Depression.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2008, the world financial system was sent into the
2
worst crisis since the Great Depression. As major financial institutions faced liquidity problems and stock prices dropped severely, the
crisis began to have widespread economic repercussions in the Unit3
ed States and around the world. With mounting fears that the Unit-

*

J.D., 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A, 2009, Seton Hall University. The author would like to thank E.C. and his family for their love and support.
1
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform at
Cooper
Union,
New
York,
N.Y.
(Apr.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-wall-street-reform.
2
John Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, with No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169431617549947.html.
The U.S. financial system resembles a patient in intensive care. The
body is trying to fight off a disease that is spreading, and as it does so,
the body convulses, settles for a time and then convulses again. The illness seems to be overwhelming the self-healing tendencies of markets.
The doctors in charge are resorting to ever-more invasive treatment,
and are now experimenting with remedies that have never before been
applied.
Id.
3
See Timeline: Global Economy in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18709/timeline.html (follow “Meltdown (2007-

1229

GALLOGLY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1230

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/24/2012 5:41 PM

[Vol. 42:1229

ed States was facing the possibility of a depression, the federal government took drastic steps aimed at preventing further economic decline with the passing of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)
4
legislation and the Federal Stimulus Bill.
In response to the financial crisis and what Congress perceived
as its root causes, the Obama Administration pushed for the passage
5
of a financial regulatory overhaul bill. Congress approved the financial reform bill known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
6
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in July 2010. The financial reform bill was aimed at preventing the practices and events
7
that led to the 2008 crisis. Within the Dodd-Frank Act were a number of provisions that created new regulations for executive compen8
sation, including what is known as the clawback provision. The
clawback provision requires publicly held companies to recover comPresent)” hyperlink; then follow hyperlinks in the timeline for the fall of 2008) (last
modified Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Timeline].
In fall 2008 the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged dramatically,
banks became unwilling or unable to lend to one another, and the
once highly liquid and low-risk commercial paper market evaporated.
This was followed by massive government bailouts of commercial
banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions that on a
worldwide basis exceeded $2 trillion.
JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (6th ed. 2009).
4
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Nagourney, Partisan Fight Endures as Stimulus
Bill Signed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 20099, at A17; Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic
Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122304922742602533.html?KEYWORDS=troubled+
asset+relief+program.
5
Matt Spetalnick, Obama Pushes Wall Street Reform with Populism, REUTERS (May
15, 2010, 6:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/15/us-financialregulation-obama-idUSTRE64B50I20100515 (quoting President Obama as saying
that “[w]e’ll make our financial system more transparent by bringing the kinds of
complex, back room deals that helped trigger this crisis into the light of day [and
w]e’ll prevent banks from taking on so much risk that they could collapse and
threaten our whole economy”).
6
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Binyamin Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES (July
15,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16regulate.html?adxnnl=1&ref=fin
ancial_regulatory_reform&adxnnlx=1284934684-Ea8YFikIeLLs0O5a4h+3Cw.
7
See Appelbaum & Herzenhom, supra note 6. “That era of hands-off optimism
was gaveled to an end on Thursday as the Senate gave final approval to a bill that reasserts the importance of federal supervision of financial transactions.” Id.
8
Joseph Alley, Jr. et al., Executive Compensation and Governance Provisions of the
ETHICS
(July
22,
2010),
http://businessDodd
Frank
Act,
BUS.
ethics.com/2010/07/22/1640-executive-compensation-and-corporate-governanceprovisions-of-the-dodd-frank-act/.
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pensation from their executive officers under certain circumstances.
The inclusion of the clawback provision in the Dodd-Frank Act reflects the earlier inclusion of another clawback provision in the Sar10
banes-Oxley Act of 2002. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
11
response to a wave of corporate scandal and corruption. Based on
the similarities and the differences in the two provisions, the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley
provision may have important implications for the future of the
Dodd-Frank provision.
While the clawback provision of the Dodd-Frank Act aimed to
help avoid a repeat of the financial crisis, its effectiveness may depend on the how it is interpreted, implemented, and enforced. This
is especially relevant in regard to whether executive officers are able
to escape personal liability for money owed. The uncertainty surrounding the clawback provision of the Dodd-Frank Act raises a
number of interesting and important legal issues. Part II of this
Comment will examine the global financial crisis, including the contributing factors, the American public’s reaction, and the federal
government’s response. Part III will review the two relevant clawback
provisions—one found in the Dodd-Frank Act and the other in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It will examine the requirements of each provision, the differences and similarities of the provisions, and the interactions between the provisions. Part IV will analyze the steps that executive officers may take to try to avoid liability for money owed
under the Dodd-Frank provision, including indemnification, director
and officer insurance, and personal bankruptcy. It will examine the
manner in which courts might prevent executive officers from using
these methods to avoid liability. Part V will explain why courts should
prevent executive officers from escaping liability under the DoddFrank provision by using these various methods. Such rulings will effectuate Congress’s policies behind implementing the Dodd-Frank
Act. Specifically, the author will argue that the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the clawback provision of the
Dodd-Frank Act may have significant effects on how companies operate and how executive officers behave going forward. These issues

9
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat.
at 1904; see also Alley, Jr. et al., supra note 8.
10
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006); see also Rachael
E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep
the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2008).
11
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1.
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surrounding the clawback provision are so important because of their
potential economic impact.
II. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE CAUSES, THE PUBLIC OUTCRY,
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE
12

Often referred to as “The Great Recession,” the financial crisis,
and the economic downturn that followed, have their origins in a
13
number of different places. Dating back to 2007, a combination of
economic and financial factors came together and pushed the world
14
economy to the brink of disaster. While there has been no consen15
sus as to the exact causes of the crisis, most experts agree that certain factors played a role in triggering the crisis, including the mortgage bubble, excessive leverage, and deregulation of the financial
16
industry. The presence of incentives for risk-taking by management
at financial institutions is often cited as one of the factors that played
17
an important role in the crisis. The compensation structure for executives and managers incentivized risk-taking by placing a large
18
amount of their pay in performance based bonuses. This compensation structure encouraged executives and managers to take high
risks because the structure rewarded short-term success. As a result,
executives were tempted to pursue short-term gains, even where the
19
action could hurt the company’s long term stability and health. As
12
Courtney Schlisserman, “Great Recession” Gets Recognition as Entry in AP Stylebook,
(Feb.
23,
2010),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ayojB2KWQG4k.
13
See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40173, CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 1 (Apr. 9, 2009).
14
Id.
15
Even the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did not provide a completely definitive analysis of the reasons for the financial crisis even though it produced three
separate reports. M.V., The Financial-Crisis Commission Fails to Solve the Whodunit,
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
27,
2011,
4:03
PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/americas_financialcrisis_commission (noting that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was unable
reach a consensus on the causes of the financial crisis and stating that “the result is
an unfortunate loss of credibility and, confusingly, three competing narratives”).
16
JINKLING, supra note 13, at 5–8.
17
Id. at 6.
18
Id.
19
Jian Cai et al., Compensation and Risk Incentives in Banking and Finance, FED.
RESERVE
BANK
CLEV.
(Sept.
14,
2010),
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-13.cfm
(“[C]ompensation structures that heavily reward short-term performance (for example, through bonuses) may encourage managers to take opportunities that would
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part of its final report, the majority of the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission concluded that the compensation systems and the incentives that the compensation structures created played a role in
20
the financial crisis. These systems encouraged going after the big
21
bet, without properly considering the long term consequences. Often, the “big bets” involved a large amount of leveraging by the financial institutions, which left them “vulnerable to financial distress or
22
ruin if the value of their investments declined even modestly.”
The collapse of the financial giant Lehman Brothers is one of
the most prominent examples of the results that excessive risk-taking
23
can have on a company’s stability and the economy in general. Exboost immediate profitability but risk future financial health.”). As early as 2005,
there were warnings about the perverse incentives that the compensation structures
of investment managers created. See Raghuram Rajan, Has Financial Development Made
the World Riskier? 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11728,
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11728.pdf?new_window=1. The
perverse incentives were thought to have the potential to create the conditions for a
major crisis in the financial system. Id.
20
FIN. CRISIS COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT at xvii–xix, available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. The international community also recognized the role that compensation and its incentives
played in the global financial crisis, with the leaders of the G20 stating that strong
international standards for compensation must be implemented to reduce excessive
risk-taking. LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT para. 17 (2009), available
at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm.
21
FIN. CRISIS COMM’N, note 20, at xix.
22
Id.
23
See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Financial Serv. Comm., 111th Cong. 179 (2010) (prepared statement of
Mary Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (stating that the collapse of
Lehman Brothers reflected larger problems in the financial system, including incentives for excess risk-taking and insufficient risk management). Between 2000 and
2008, the top executives at Lehman Brothers received an estimated $1 billion from
cash bonuses and equity sales. Lucian Bebchuk, et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257
(2010). During the same period, the top executives at Bear Stearns received over
$1.4 billion from cash bonuses and equity shares. Id. The near collapse and emergency sale of Bear Stearns is another example of consequences of excessive risktaking by financial institutions. Yalman Onaran, JPMorgan Surges After Striking Deal for
Bear
Stearns,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
17,
2008,
4:02
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aK2pw3mrmCUQ.
“[The] fire-sale to JPMorgan cap[ped] an eight-month slide in the company’s fortunes that began [in] July [2007] with the collapse of two of its hedge funds, which
invested in securities linked to subprime mortgages.” Id. With the signs of the coming financial crisis mounting in 2007, the seven largest Wall Street firms paid $122
billion in total compensation and benefits, even as their net revenues fell. Tomoeh
Murakami & Renae Merle, The Bonuses Keep Coming, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at D1.
These firms included Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase, Merrill
Lynch, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup. Id. These pay packages came
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ecutives at Lehman Brothers undertook risk-taking activities, such as
investing in subprime mortgages and mortgage backed securities,
which eventually helped lead to the company’s collapse in the fall of
24
2008. Management’s excessive risk-taking in the major financial institutions and large corporations was indicative of a larger, systemic
risk-taking, which was allowed to occur primarily due to deregulation
25
of the financial industry. This systemic risk-taking was one of the
26
major factors that plunged the global economy into crisis.
The deregulation of the financial industry occurred over the
past few decades, as the federal government relied on the selfregulation of the market rather than on government oversight and
27
enforcement. For example, in 1999, Congress passed the Gramm28
Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The
Glass-Steagall Act had restricted the co-ownership of commercial
banks, which undertake everyday banking activity, and investment
29
banks, which underwrite securities. At the time of the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act, many lawmakers and officials believed that it would
in a year during which the firms reported $55 billion in mortgage-related losses and
shareholders suffered $200 billion in lost value. Id.
24
Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing
Before the H. Financial Serv. Comm., 111th Cong. 181 (2010) (prepared statement of
Mary Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
25
JICKLING, supra note 13, at 6. The collapse of Washington Mutual in 2008 is a
strong example of the risk-taking by financial institutions and the lack of regulation
by government authorities. See Floyd Norris, Eyes Open, WaMu Collapsed Just the Same,
TIMES,
Mar.
25,
2011,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/25norris.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=wa
mu&st=cse#. Prior to the 2008 crisis, top executives at Washington Mutual forecasted the coming problems with the housing market. Id. Despite recognizing the high
risk involved in the housing market, the bank continued to take on large amounts of
bad mortgage loans. Id. Regulators, specifically the Office of Thrift Supervision,
were made aware of the problems at Washington Mutual but failed to take any significant action in response. Id. In the end, Washington Mutual collapsed and became
one of the largest bank failures in American history. Id.
26
JICKLING, supra note 13, at 6.
27
See Timeline, supra note 3 (follow “Regulation & Deregulation (1880-Present)”
hyperlink; then follow hyperlinks in timeline from 1990 to 2010); Anthony Faiola et
al.,
What
Went
Wrong,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.15,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101403343.html?sid=ST2008101403344.
28
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006); see also Cyrus Sanati, 10 Years Later, Looking at the
Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2009, 3:45 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-looking-at-repeal-of-glasssteagall/.
29
Sanati, supra note 28.
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allow American financial institutions to compete against foreign institutions in a globalized economy by removing what they perceived as
antiquated Depression-era restrictions that were holding back the
30
U.S. financial system. Ten years after the repeal, many experts believe that the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 because “the huge banks born out of the revocation of
Glass-Steagall, especially Citigroup, and the insurance companies that
were allowed to deal in securities, like the American International
Group, would not have run into trouble had the law still been in
31
place.”
The American public responded to the imprudent and risky behavior of the financial industry with anger and disapproval. According to a Pew Research Center report from 2010, a large majority of
Americans have a negative view of financial institutions and banks,
with only twenty-two percent of Americans saying that they view these
32
institutions positively. The actions of the large financial institutions
created a feeling of disconnection between “Main Street” and “Wall
Street” within the American public. This perception of “Wall Street”
culture is fueled by the fact that companies handed out billions of
dollars in bonuses, while the rest of the country was facing high un33
employment and tough economic choices. In fact, a report from
30

Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing Banking Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A1. Interestingly, the lawmakers who opposed the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act predicted “that the deregulation of Wall Street would someday
wreak havoc on the nation’s financial system.” Id.
31
Sanati, supra note 28. The financial crisis of 2008 has been viewed as a vindication of those lawmakers and experts who opposed the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act
and predicted that it would cause financial disaster. Sam Stein, Glass-Steagall Act: The
Senators and Economists Who Got It Right, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2009, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/11/glass-steagall-act-these_n_201557.html.
32
Distrust, Discontent, Anger, and Partisan Rancor: Overview, PEW RES. CTR. FOR
PEOPLE & PRESS (Apr. 18, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/606/trust-ingovernment. The Pew Center research found that twenty-two percent of those surveyed believe that banks and other financial institutions have a positive effect on the
way things are going in the country. Id. In the same survey, seventy-one percent of
respondents believed that small businesses have a positive effect on the country. Id.;
see also 47%—Public Shows Wariness about Wall Street, PEW RES. CTR. THE DATABANK,
http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1345 (last visited Apr.
21, 2012). A May 2011 survey found that forty-seven percent of respondents believe
that Wall Street hurts the U.S. economy more than it helps. Id.
33
Frank Ahrens, Admiration Turns to Anger as Wall St. Bosses Feather Nests, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
31,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/30/AR2009013003665.html. As the profits of financial institutions have returned, so have the compensation packages for the institutions’ top executives. See Eric Dash & Susanne Craig, Big Paydays Return with Big Prof-
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the New York comptroller stated that Wall Street firms gave out $18.4
billion in bonuses for 2008, despite the fact that it was “one of the
34
worst years ever on the Street.” The backlash against bonuses was
compounded by the wide-spread perception that the taxpayers are
35
funding them through federal bailout funds.
Early in its term, the Obama Administration responded to the
outrage of the American public and put forward its proposal for an
36
overhaul of the financial regulatory system. The wide-ranging proposal was the most sweeping overhaul since the reforms enacted in

its at Wall St. Banks, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2011, 9:11 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/big-paydays-return-with-big-profits-atwall-st-banks/?partner=rss&emc=rss. Similarly, another writer remarks,
So far, this recovery has not trickled down. After two relatively lean
years, C.E.O.’s in finance, technology, energy and beyond are pulling
down multimillion-dollar paychecks. What many of these executives
aren’t doing, however, is hiring. Unemployment, although down from
its peak, stood at 8.8 percent in March. And few economists predict the
jobless rate will drop substantially anytime soon.
Daniel Costello, The Drought is over (At Least for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at
BU1. In 2010, the three highest-paid CEO’s earned $84.5 million, $76.1 million, and
$70.1 million, respectively. Id. The compensation packages were not as lucrative in
2011, with Wall Street’s bonuses falling twenty-five percent from the previous year.
John Gralla, Wall Street Bonuses Fell 25 Percent in 2011, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2012, 4:15
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-wallstreet-bonusesidUSTRE8241FJ20120306.
34
Ahrens, supra note 33. In 2008 alone, Merrill Lynch paid out $209 million in
bonuses to ten of its highest-paid executives despite suffering a net loss of $27.6 billion. Merrill’s Top Earners Took $209 Million in 2009, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Mar.
4,
2009,
7:19
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/04/merrills-top-earners-took-209-million-in2008-report-says/. In response to the outrage over bonuses, Congress included within the Federal Stimulus Bill a number of limitations on bonuses for executives at financial institutions that had received government assistance. Tomoeh Murakami
Tse, Congress Trumps Obama by Cuffing Bonuses on CEOs, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021303288.html?sid=ST2009021302017.
35
See Ahrens, supra note 33. As President Obama remarked,
Now, Americans don’t begrudge anybody for success when that success
is earned. But when we read in the past, and sometimes in the present,
about enormous executive bonuses at firms—even as they’re relying on
assistance from taxpayers or they’re taking huge risks that threaten the
system as a whole or their company is doing badly—it offends our fundamental values.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform at Cooper
Union, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-wall-street-reform.
36
Helene Cooper, Obama Pushes Financial Regulatory Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 2009, at A20.
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37

response to the Great Depression. As the Administration pushed for
the passage of the financial reform bill, President Obama expressed
his anger with the behavior of the financial industry and attempted to
38
appeal to the American public’s frustration and anger. After two
years of debate, Congress finally approved the financial reform bill,
39
and President Obama signed it into law in July of 2010. Known as
the Dodd-Frank Act, the legislation is aimed at preventing another
major financial crisis by regulating the behaviors, instruments, and
40
practices that are seen as having facilitated the collapse. Many proponents of the legislation argued that the overhaul was long overdue
as the regulatory system had failed to keep pace with the innovations
41
and changes in the financial markets.
The Dodd-Frank Act covers a wide range of areas within the financial industry, with provisions that regulate credit cards, consumer
42
protection, mortgages, credit rating agencies, and derivatives. Within the Dodd-Frank Act, there are numerous provisions that created
new regulations for executive compensation, including a “Say on Pay”
provision, a “Compensation Committees” provision, and an “Execu43
tive Compensation Disclosure” provision. These provisions are part
of a larger objective to strengthen corporate governance in order to

37

Obama’s Financial Reform Plan: The Condensed Version, WALL ST. J. WASH. WIRE
(June 17, 2009, 2:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/06/17/obamasfinancial-reform-plan-the-condensed-version/.
38
See Jeff Zeleny, As the Public Simmers, Obama Lets Off Steam, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2009, at A9.
39
Appelbaum & Herszenhorn, supra note 6.
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
See also Jill Jackson, Wall Street Reform: A Summary of What’s in the Bill, CBS NEWS
(June 25, 2010, 11:48 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008835503544.html.
43
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 951–57, 124
Stat. 1376, 1889–1907 (2010) (to be codified at in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see
also Alley Jr. et al., supra note 8 (describing the provisions and labeling them by their
commonly used nicknames). For example, in 2011, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) proposed rules under Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act. SEC
Proposes Rules on Disclosure of Incentive-Based Compensation at Financial Institution, U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(Mar.
2,
2011),
http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-57.htm. Section 956 calls for federal regulators to require “covered financial institutions” to disclose information on the structure of the institutions’ incentive-based compensation arrangements and to prohibit
compensation arrangements that regulators determine encourage excessive risk.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 956.
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44

avoid the oversight issues that occurred prior to the crisis. The intent behind the provisions is to provide shareholders with better
oversight and more involvement in the regulation and formation of a
45
company’s executive compensation. As part of the new regulations
on executive compensation, Congress included a provision entitled
46
“Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation.” This provision
47
is Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act and it is most commonly re48
ferred to as the clawback provision. This provision mandates that
publicly traded companies institute policies that would require exec49
utive officers to return compensation in certain situations. Congress
enacted this provision to discourage executives from making high-risk
decisions that would have short-term gains but eventually hurt the
50
stability and strength of the company.
Congress anticipated that
this would deter executives from making these high-risk decisions because, in the end, the executives could be forced to return a part of
51
their compensation. Congress also determined that it would be unfair to shareholders if executives were allowed to keep compensation
52
that they had been rewarded erroneously. The following parts will
examine Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act provision and the legal
issues surrounding its implementation and enforcement.
III. THE CLAWBACK PROVISION OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
A. Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 954 falls under “Subtitle E—
Accountability and Executive Compensation,” and it places new regulations on the governance of executive compensation within compa-

44

THE INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, U.S. REGULATORY REFORM: THE INVESTOR’S
PERSPECTIVE,
at
22
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/investment%20issues/Invest
ors%27%20Working%20Group%20Report%20%28July%202009%29.pdf.
45
See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133–36 (2010).
46
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat.
at 1904.
47
Id.
48
Alley, Jr. et al., supra note 8.
49
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat.
at 1904; see also Alley, Jr. et al., supra note 8.
50
THE INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, supra note 44, at 23.
51
See id.
52
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136.
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53

nies. Section 954 amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
54
adding Section 10D.
Under Section 954, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is required to put in place rules that require any company that is listed on a national securities exchange to
develop and implement a policy providing
for disclosure of the policy of the issuer on incentive-based compensation that is based on financial information required to be
reported under the securities laws; and
that, in the event that the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the
issuer with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the issuer will recover from any current or former executive officer of the issuer who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options awarded as compensation) during
the 3-year period preceding the date on which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what would have been paid to the execu55
tive officer under the accounting restatement.

Section 954 thus requires the SEC to put the burden on the companies listed on national securities exchanges to create and enforce
56
clawback policies. These policies would require companies to recover portions of incentive-based compensation from executive officers; incentive-based pay includes not only bonuses but also stock op57
tions that were given as compensation. The clawback policy will
come into play when a company is required to prepare an accounting
restatement as a result of the company’s material noncompliance
58
with any financial reporting requirements under securities laws. In
that event, the company is required to recover the portion of the incentive-based pay that is in excess of what the executive would have
59
been paid under the accounting restatement. This requirement covers the incentive-based pay that was rewarded during the three-year
period prior to the date when the accounting restatement was re60
quired. Section 954 also requires that the SEC create rules that or53

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat.
at 1904.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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der the national securities exchanges to prohibit the listing of any
company that does not develop and implement a proper clawback
61
policy.
With the language that is in place, Congress has delegated power
to the SEC to fill in the specifics of the rules that will govern the
62
clawback policy. The SEC has yet to promulgate these rules but it is
63
expected to have them in place by June of 2012. There are a number of questions left open for the SEC to answer when writing these
rules. On what date does the triggering event of a restatement occur
so that the three-year period can be calculated? Who is considered
an executive officer? What must a company do to “implement” the
clawback policy? How does a company “recover” the “excess” com64
pensation? And how is the “excess” compensation calculated? These are all important questions that the SEC must consider when it is
promulgating the new rules pursuant to Section 954. As of the writing of this Comment, the SEC had not proposed rules pursuant to
Section 954. While the rules will most likely address important unresolved issues, their implementation is not likely to affect the analysis
in this Comment because the rules are not likely to address the issues
discussed in this Comment.
B. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In order to better understand Section 954 and the provision’s
future implementation, it may be helpful to examine the clawback
provision enacted and enforced prior to the Dodd-Frank Act. In the
aftermath of high-profile corporate scandals, which resulted in the
61

Id. § 954.
Deborah Lifshey, et al., Summary of Clawback Policies Under Dodd-Frank Reform
(July
23,
2010),
Act,
BOARDMEMBER.COM
https://www.boardmember.com/Print.aspx?id=5146.
63
Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivityupcoming.shtml#08-12-11 (last modified Apr. 18, 2012). The SEC stated that it
planned to propose and adopt rules pursuant to Section 954 sometime between January and June of 2012. Id. Originally, the SEC stated that the rules for Section 954
would be proposed and adopted by the end of 2011. SEC Delays Implementation of
Dodd-Frank Executive Compensation Requirements, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON
LLP
(Aug.
1,
2011),
http://www.cgsh.com/sec_delays_planned_implementation_for_doddfrank_executive_compensation_requirements/.
64
William R. Baker III et al., A Tale of Two Clawbacks: The Compensation Consequences of Misstated Financials, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=FirmPublicationDetail&office=2&publicati
on=3662.
62
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collapse of major corporations, Congress responded by enacting the
65
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
These scandals involved companies
66
such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Global Crossing. The amount
of corporate fraud and corruption was shocking to many Americans
67
and resulted in a loss of investor confidence in the system. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was aimed at improving accountability, integrity, and
transparency in the accounting and financial practices of major cor68
porations. The objective was for investors to have more accurate
knowledge when considering whether to invest in a corporation and
to make investors more confident that their investments would be
69
safe from fraud and corruption. The overarching goal behind the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was to prevent the wide-ranging negative conse70
quences that followed corporate scandals.
Within Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress includ71
ed a clawback provision. Under Section 304, in the event that an issuer of stock is required to prepare an accounting restatement as a
result of misconduct, the CEO and CFO of the issuer are to reimburse the issuer for
any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and

65

See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 4.
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2004).
Sarbanes-Oxley would not have been enacted if Enron had been an isolated event. Enron’s bankruptcy was soon followed by the financial collapse of approximately a dozen large public companies where there
was also strong evidence of reporting violations and audit failures even
more egregious than that which occurred in Enron.
COX ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.
67
See Johnson & Sides, supra note 66, at 1153.
68
J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring
Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 343 (2005).
69
See Allison List, Note, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley: Why is
the SEC Ignoring Its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate Misconduct?, 70 OHIO ST.
L.J. 195, 197–98 (2009).
70
See id. at 198 (“The concern became that investors had lost confidence in the
market and would pull their money out of the market, leading to an economic downturn if something was not done to fix the problem.”).
71
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
66
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any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during
72
that 12-month period.

Because of the similarities between this provision and Section 954 of
the Dodd-Frank Act, it may be instructive to compare the two provisions and consider how they interact with each other.
C. The Interaction Between Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act and
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The provision set forth in Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act
expands on the provision set forth in Section 304 of the SarbanesOxley Act. The two clawback provisions co-exist, as Section 954 does
73
not preempt or replace Section 304. While the provisions comple74
ment each other, they overlap in many ways. Specifically, the two
provisions call for very similar actions in very similar situations. Both
provisions call for executive compensation to be returned to the
company in circumstances in which the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement because of material noncompliance
75
with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws.
The general aim of both provisions is similar—they both attempt to
76
discourage certain types of behavior by executive officers. Section
954 is intended to discourage excessive risk-taking by executive officers, while Section 304 is intended to improve corporate management
77
to discourage fraudulent or wrongful conduct by executive officers.
While the overall requirements of the provisions are similar,
there are a number of important differences between them. One of
the most important differences is that Section 304 is only triggered
when the accounting restatement resulted from misconduct, while
78
Section 954 does not require any such misconduct. Another important difference is that Section 304 covers only the CFOs and CEOs
of a company, while Section 954 applies to all current and former
79
“executive officers.” Also, Section 304 requires repayment of all in72

Id.
Baker III et al., supra note 64.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136 (2010); see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 8.
77
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136; see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 8.
78
Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4),
with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006); see also Baker III et
al., supra note 64.
79
Supra note 78; see also Baker III et al., supra note 64.
73
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centive-based and equity-based compensation, along with all stock
profits, while Section 954 only requires the repayment of incentivebased compensation, including stock options awarded as compensa80
tion, that are in excess of what should have been granted. Finally,
Section 304 covers compensation received in the year following the
issuance of a misstated financial statement, while Section 954 covers
compensation received in the three years before the date on which
81
the company was required to file the restatement. The overall effect
of these differences is that Section 304 is a narrower provision than
Section 954, because it applies in fewer circumstances than Section
954. The wider scope of Section 954 may make it more effective than
Section 304.
D. Enforcement of Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Implications for the Future Enforcement of Section 954 of the DoddFrank Act
Due to the similarities between the clawback provisions of both
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the manner in
which the clawback provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been interpreted, implemented, and enforced may have significant implications for the clawback provision of the Dodd-Frank Act. Based on the
language of the clawback provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, courts
have held that only the SEC can bring an action against a company
82
under Section 304. This means that the provision does not create a
private right of action under which individuals can bring suit against
83
a company. The courts have reasoned, based on the plain language
of the text and the legislative intent, that there is no private right of
action because the statute does not expressly or implicitly create
84
one. For example, the Ninth Circuit in In re Digimarc Corp. held that
“Section 304 does not explicitly create a private right of action because nothing the text of the section makes any mention of a cause of

80

See Baker III et al., supra note 64.
Id.
82
See In re Digimarc Corp., 549 F.3d 1223, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008); In re iBasis, Inc.
Deriv. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223 (D. Mass. 2007); In re BISYS Grp. Inc., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (E.D. Pa.
2005).
83
See In re Digimarc, 549 F.3d at 1230–31; In re iBasis, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 224; In re
BISYS, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 464; Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 652–58.
84
See In re Digimarc, 549 F.3d at 1230–31; In re iBasis, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 224; In re
BISYS, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 464; Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 652–58.
81
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85

action.” The court also held that Section 304 does not implicitly
create a private right of action “[b]ecause the text and the structure
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not demonstrate an intent to create a
86
private right of action under [S]ection 304.”
Since there is no private right of action under Section 304, the
87
enforcement of the provision falls solely on the SEC. For the first
seven years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC did not exercise its
88
power under Section 304 very frequently. This trend has changed
recently as the SEC has stepped up its enforcement of Section 304
89
and brought actions against company executives. According to the
SEC Director of Enforcement, Robert Khuzami, the SEC took action
against fourteen executive officers in eleven cases from 2008 to
90
2010. The most prominent case of SEC enforcement of Section 304
91
is SEC v. Jenkins. There, the SEC brought an independent action
based on its power under Section 304 against the CEO of an auto92
parts company. The SEC sought reimbursement of four million dol93
lars in incentive-based pay and profits made from the sale of stock.
The action was based on accounting restatements made by the com94
pany due to “pervasive accounting fraud.”
The defendant challenged the action, arguing that Section 304 did not apply because the
95
The
SEC had not alleged misconduct on the defendant’s part.
court disagreed and held that Section 304 allows the SEC to seek reimbursement of executive compensation even when the defendant is

85

In re Digimarc, 549 F.3d at 1230.
Id. at 1233.
87
See Baker III et al., supra note 64.
88
Id.
89
Thomas P. Cimino, Jr. et al., SEC Uses Section 304 to Claw Back Incentive-Based
Compensation from “Innocent” Executives—SEC v. O’Dell & SEC v. Jenkins, NAT’L L.
REV. (Sept. 9., 2010), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-uses-section-304-toclaw-back-incentive-based-compensation-innocent-executives. The SEC settled a suit
against the CEO of Beazer Homes for $6.5 million in March 2011, which was brought
under Section 304. SEC Obtains Settlement with CEO to Recover Compensation and Stock
Profits He Received During Company’s Fraud, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 3,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-61.htm.
90
Richard Khuzami, Director, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech to the Society
of American Business Editors and Writers (Mar. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch031910rsk.htm.
91
See Cimino, Jr. et al., supra note 89.
92
SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072–73 (D. Ariz. 2010).
93
Id. at 1073.
94
Cimino, Jr. et al., supra note 89.
95
Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
86
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not alleged to have committed misconduct. The court also held
that only misconduct by the company is required for an action under
97
Section 304. By allowing the SEC to bring an action against an executive who has not been accused of misconduct, this case permits
98
the SEC to pursue action against a larger group of executives. It
remains to be seen if the SEC will take advantage of this power.
The enforcement under Section 304 may have important implications for the future enforcement of Section 954, as the SEC and the
courts may treat Section 954 and Section 304 in a similar manner.
First, the SEC will most likely be able to bring action against an executive whose company is required to prepare an accounting restatement because otherwise there would be no way to enforce the provision in case that companies fail to enforce their clawback policies on
their own. While a non-compliant company may be delisted from the
national securities exchanges, this will not help with reimbursement
99
of the compensation that was erroneously awarded. Second, the
SEC will most likely be aggressive in its enforcement of Section 954,
as the SEC considers clawback provisions to be an important tool in
100
its enforcement of corporate governance.
This eagerness to exercise the power of clawback provisions is evidenced in the recent in101
crease in suits that the SEC has brought under Section 304. Third,
courts will have to determine whether there is a private right of action under Section 954 that would allow individuals to bring suits
against companies that are not in compliance. Based on the In re
Digimarc Corp. court’s analysis, the court will only find a private right
102
of action if it was expressly or implicitly granted by the statute. Although Section 954 does not explicitly provide for a private cause of
action, courts may find that the language implicitly grants a private
right of action by requiring that companies “implement” the claw96

Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1074–75.
98
See id. For example, the SEC brought a “clawback” suit against the CEO of
Beazer Homes, even though he was not personally charged with misconduct. SEC
Obtains Settlement with CEO to Recover Compensation and Stock Profits He Received During
Company’s Fraud, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-61.htm. Despite not being implicated
in the fraud that took place at Beazer, Ian J. McCarthy agreed to reimburse the company for his compensation in 2006, totaling around $6.5 million. Id.
99
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4).
100
See Khuzami, supra note 90.
101
See id.
102
549 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2008).
97
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103

back policy. This language seems to imply that the enforcement of
104
the provision rests on the companies.
If the courts do hold that
there is a private right of action, this could give shareholders an important new weapon and could result in shareholder derivative suits
105
to enforce companies’ clawback policies. A number of factors will
influence the future enforcement of Section 954, which remains an
open question.
IV. POSSIBLE METHODS OF ESCAPING LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 954
The effectiveness of future enforcement of Section 954 may face
another possible challenge, in addition to the issues involved in how
the provision is enforced in the future. Executive officers may attempt to escape liability for money owed under Section 954 by employing a number of different tactics. The means by which executive
officers may try to avoid liability could include indemnification, director and officer insurance, and personal bankruptcy. All three of these methods could present executive officers, who were ordered to return compensation to their companies, with the opportunity to
circumvent the personal liability that Section 954 imposes. If executive officers are allowed to use these methods to avoid liability, the effectiveness of Section 954 will be significantly reduced.
A. Indemnification
Indemnification is one of the most reliable corporate protec106
tions afforded to directors and officers.
Indemnification is the
method by which a corporation agrees to “reimburse any agent, employee, officer, or director for reasonable expenses for losses of any
sort arising from any actual or threatened judicial proceeding or in107
vestigation.”
Most states have indemnification provisions within
their corporate statutes that allow for both mandatory indemnifica108
tion rights and elective indemnification rights. In order for a corporation to indemnify a director or an officer, most corporate stat-

103
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat.
at 1904.
104
See id.
105
Baker III et al., supra note 64.
106
WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 243 (5th ed. 2009).
107
Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145
(2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 722 (McKinney 2011).
108
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 243.
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utes require that the losses result from good-faith conduct on behalf
of the corporation and that the losses not result from a criminal con109
viction. The policy reasoning behind these statutory requirements
is “to encourage capable people to serve as corporate employees, officers and directors by permitting corporations to shield them from
110
liability for their official activities.” Indemnification rights also provide corporate officials with the ability to defend themselves against
111
suits brought against them in their official capacity.
Executive officers who face liability under Section 954 may attempt to have their losses indemnified by the corporation in order to
be reimbursed for the compensation that they are required to return.
This attempt, however, may not be successful. A recent court decision, for instance, prevented the indemnification of executive officers
112
who faced liability under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In
Cohen v. Viray, the dispute focused on a settlement agreement in a
shareholders’ derivative suit, which included provisions that released
and indemnified the CEO and the CFO of the corporation against all
113
liability under Section 304. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the SEC objected to the approval of the settlement agreement based
114
While the district court was
on the inclusion of those provisions.
considering whether to approve the settlement agreement, the SEC
brought a separate action against the former CEO seeking the return
115
of $186 million under Section 304.
After the district court approved the settlement agreement, the DOJ, with consultation from
the SEC, appealed the district court’s decision, arguing that the provisions of the settlement agreement that released and indemnified
the CEO and the CFO nullified the SEC’s ability to enforce Section
116
304.
Ultimately, the court held that the settlement agreement

109

Id.
In re Miller, 290 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2002). “No corporation can be a success unless led by competent and energetic officers and directors. Such individuals
would be unwilling to serve if exposed to the broad range of potential liability and
legal costs inherent in such service despite the most scrupulous regard for the interests of stockholders.” Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., No. 6936–VCG, 2012 WL 395826,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2012).
111
In re Miller, 290 F.3d at 267 (citing VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 87
(Del. 1998)).
112
See Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2010).
113
Id. at 190.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 192.
116
Id. at 194.
110
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could not include provisions that release and indemnify the CEO and
117
CFO for liability under Section 304. The court reasoned that these
provisions would frustrate the power of the SEC to pursue the public
interests in litigation and would “fly . . . in the face of Congress’s efforts to make high ranking corporate officers of public companies directly responsible for their actions that have caused material non118
compliance with financial reporting requirements.”
According to
the court, if the settlement agreement was allowed to stand, the CEO
and CFO would be able to pass their liability onto the corporation
119
and “would suffer no penalty at all.”
Based on the Second Circuit’s decision in Cohen, a company may
not be able to indemnify its executive officers for liability under Sec120
tion 954.
Due to the similarities between Section 954 and Section
304, the court’s reasoning would most likely apply to liability under
Section 954 as well. If executive officers could be indemnified for
their losses under Section 954, this would nullify the provision and
would frustrate the legislative intent behind the provision. Indemnification would allow executive officers to simply pass the liability onto
their companies, effectively allowing executive officers to escape any
penalty for their actions. This would prevent Section 954 from serving the public interest and from ensuring “the integrity of the finan121
cial markets.”
Allowing for indemnification of liability under Section 954 would permit executive officers to escape responsibility for
their actions and decisions, an outcome that courts are not likely to
be comfortable with.
B. Director and Officer Insurance
Director and officer (D&O) liability insurance has become an
122
important tool for large corporations.
Almost all large companies
117

Id. at 195.
Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195. “The SEC’s decision to pursue § 304 relief is not solely
intended to reimburse a company; it also furthers important public purposes. The §
304 remedy is an enforcement mechanism that ensures the integrity of the financial
markets.” Id. Based on similar reasoning, the Second Circuit has held that an underwriter is not entitled to indemnification by an issuer for violations of federal securities laws because it would be against the public policy embodied by the federal securities laws and would encourage flouting of federal securities laws. Globus v. Law
Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288. (2d Cir. 1969).
119
Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195.
120
See id.
121
Id.
122
Michael Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble Filled Thicket: The “Insured vs. Insured”
Exclusion in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 366 (2007). Many
118
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maintain D&O liability insurance as a way of protecting their directors and officers from liability stemming from actions that are con123
nected to their corporate positions. While every insurance policy is
different, most policies have some standard provisions that define the
terms of the policy and outline what is covered by the policy and what
124
is not.
Most standard D&O liability insurance policies include Insurance Agreement A, also known as “A-Side Coverage,” which provides direct coverage for directors and officers for losses that result
from actions taken against them for “wrongful acts” committed in
125
their corporate capacity.
This means that the insurance provider
will cover the monetary award or settlement that the director or of126
ficer is obligated to pay.
The “A-Side Coverage” applies when the
127
corporation cannot or does not indemnify its directors and officers.
If courts disallow indemnification for the money owed under
Section 954, then executive officers may attempt to have the loss covered by their companies’ D&O liability insurance. The ability of the
executive officers to have their losses covered by insurance will de128
pend largely on the insurance policy of the individual company.
But there are several arguments why the money owed under Section
954 are not be recoverable under D&O insurance policy, at least in
the policy’s most common form.
There are three main reasons why such losses may not be covered. First, coverage under most D&O liability insurance policies is
only be triggered by a claim involving a “wrongful act” committed by
129
the insured executive officer. This “wrongful act” requirement will
most likely not be met by a claim under Section 954, because the pro-

states’ corporation laws permit corporations to purchase director and officer insurance. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 726
(McKinney 2011).
123
See Sousa, supra note 122, at 366 (“Presently, as many as ninety-five percent of
Fortune 500 companies maintain directors and officers liability insurance.”).
124
See WILLIAM P. BILA & TIFFANY S. SALTZMAN-JONES, WALKER WILCOX MATOUSEK
LLP, D&O POLICY BASICS “WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW” 1 (2005), available at
http://www.wwmlawyers.com/images/uploads/00004683.pdf.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Kevin LaCroix, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and D&O Insurance, THE D&O DIARY (June 14,
2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/06/articles/d-o-insurance/sarbanesoxleyact-clawbacks-and-do-insurance/.
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130

vision does not require that there be a showing of “misconduct.”
Under Section 954, liability can occur based only on the filing of an
accounting restatement due to material noncompliance with filing
131
requirements under the securities laws.
Based on the language of
the provision, it does not seem that a clawback claim will most likely
involve any “wrongful act” and, therefore, would most likely not trigger coverage under most D&O insurance policies.
The second reason why the award under Section 954 would not
be covered by a company’s D&O liability insurance is that “liability insurers regularly refuse to cover restitutionary and disgorgement
132
amounts.” For example, most insurers will not cover awards that result from insider trading actions taken under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of
133
1934. The insurers’ refusal to cover these liabilities is based on several court rulings which hold that restitutionary and disgorgement
amounts do not fall within the meaning of “loss” under companies’
134
D&O policies.
In Level 3 Communications, Inc. v. Federal Insurance
Co., the Seventh Circuit held that the settlement award from a securities fraud suit was not a “loss” under the D&O liability insurance poli135
cy. The court agreed with the insurance provider that “a ‘loss’ within the meaning of an insurance contract does not include the
136
restoration of an ill-gotten gain.” In Conseco, Inc. v. National Union
Fire Insurance Co., the court stated that “[i]t is axiomatic that insurance cannot be used to pay an insured for amounts an insured
137
This reasoning may
wrongfully acquires and is forced to return.”
apply to monetary awards under Section 954 as well, since these
awards can be classified as disgorgements of the executive officers’
compensation. The incentive-based compensation that the executive
officer is required to return to the company may be considered an
“ill-gotten gain” because it was received based on inaccurate account130
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4).
131
Id.
132
BILA & SALTZMAN-JONES, supra note 124, at 3.
133
Id.
134
Id. (citing Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908 (7th Cir.
2001); Conseco, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 49D130202CP000348, 2002 WL
31961447 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 2002); Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d
545 (Cal. 1992)).
135
Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 272 F.3d at 910.
136
Id.
137
Conseco, Inc., 2002 WL 31961447, at *6.
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138

ing statements. Thus, the executive officer is being forced to return
the compensation because he or she was erroneously awarded that
139
money, even if there was an absence of “misconduct.”
Since the
compensation being disgorged under Section 954 can be considered
an “ill-gotten gain,” courts could hold that it cannot be covered by
D&O liability insurance policies. Therefore, if courts follow the rationales on which they have relied for denying insurance reimbursement for Section 307 claw backs, executive officers who face personal
liability under Section 954 would similarly not be reimbursed by their
company’s insurance providers.
Finally, the third reason why the award under Section 954 would
probably not be covered by D&O liability insurance is that most poli140
cies have conduct-based exclusions to coverage. Within these conduct-based exclusions, most policies exclude “coverage for any loss
based on a claim for any ‘profit or advantage’ to which the insured is
141
not legally entitled.” Courts that have interpreted the term “profit
or advantage” have held that it is a broad term, which should apply to
142
any benefit received by directors or officers. The relevant cases involved various violations of federal and state law by directors and of143
ficers. In TIG Specialty Insurance Co. v. Pinkmonkey.com Inc., the Fifth
Circuit stated that “a defendant is not legally entitled to an advantage
or profit resulting from his violation of law if he could be required to
144
return such profit.”
Based on this interpretation of the “profit or
advantage” exclusion, money owed under Section 954 would probably not be covered by D&O liability insurance policies because it is a
profit to which the executive officer is not entitled. The executive officer is not entitled to the compensation because he or she received it
based on erroneous data and would not have been awarded that
amount of money if the original accounting statement was accurate.
Since the money owed under Section 954 could fall within the “profit
or advantage” exclusion, courts could hold that insurance providers
138

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 954, 124 Stat 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4).
139
Id.
140
Bila & Saltzman-Jones, supra note 124, at 3.
141
LaCroix, supra note 129.
142
See TIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. Pinkmonkey.com Inc., 375 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir.
2004); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’’n, No. 4:07-CV-1958, 2008
WL 2405975, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
143
See TIG Specialty Ins. Co., 375 F.3d at 368; Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2008 WL
2405975, at *6.
144
TIG Specialty Ins. Co., 375 F.3d at 370.
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do not need to reimburse the executive officers for the returned
compensation. When an executive officer is required to return a portion of his or her compensation under Section 954, this portion of
the compensation will likely fall within the exclusion because the executive officer is not legally entitled to that money.
All three of these arguments why illustrate why D&O liability insurance may not cover the money that executive officers owe under
Section 954.
C. Personal Bankruptcy
One of the most common forms of bankruptcy is Chapter 7,
which is also known as the United States Bankruptcy Code’s “liquidation chapter” and is often referred to as “straight bankruptcy.” When
this procedure is undertaken, a third party liquidates the debtor’s as145
sets and distributes the proceeds to the debtor’s creditors.
Under
bankruptcy law, the debtor is allowed to discharge his or her old
146
debts. Discharge means that he or she is no longer personally liable
147
for his or her pre-bankruptcy debt. If a creditor is owed a debt, it
only receives a pro rata share of the assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy
148
estate, which is usually only cents on the dollar.
The most important policy goal of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is allowing a “fresh start”
to a debtor so that he or she has the opportunity to start anew unhin149
dered by the burden of preexisting debt.
In Grogan v. Garner, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the central purpose of bankruptcy is “to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors
can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy
‘a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unham150
pered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’”
Despite of the “fresh start” policy goal of bankruptcy, there are sever151
al exceptions to dischargeability which are found in § 523 of the

145

Lucian Murley, Note, Closing a Bankruptcy Loop-Hole or Impairing a Debtor’s Fresh
Start? Sarbanes-Oxley Creates a New Exception to Discharge, 92 KY. L.J. 317, 319 (2003).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Keith N. Sambur, Note, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Effect on Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: Are All Securities Laws Debts Really Nondischargeable?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 561, 563 (2003) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
150
Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286 (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244).
151
Id.
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152

Bankruptcy Code.
These exceptions usually involve some type of
153
culpable conduct on the part of the debtor.
While it may seem extreme for executive officers to declare personal bankruptcy in order to discharge debt owed for Section 954 liability, this may be a possibility considering the amount of money that
could be at stake. For example, in Cohen, the SEC sought to disgorge
$186 million from the executive officer under Section 304 of the Sar154
banes-Oxley Act.
In another Section 304 matter, a former CEO
agreed to return more than $400 million to his former company as
155
part of a settlement agreement. In light of potential awards or settlements of this size, there is a possibility that executive officers would
declare bankruptcy if they cannot afford to reimburse their companies. In order to prevent discharge of debt owed under Section 954,
the debt would have to fall within one of the exceptions enumerated
in § 523 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code because the general rule is that
156
most debt is dischargeable. There are two exceptions within § 523
that may apply when an executive officer is attempting to discharge
debt owed under Section 954.
157
The first possible exception is found in § 523(a)(19).
This
provision allows an exception from dischargeability if two conditions
are met: first, the plaintiff must show that the debt was the result of a
securities law violation or for fraud in connection to the purchase or
sale of a security, and, second, the debt must be set forth in a judicial

152

11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006).
Sambur, supra note 149, at 564.
154
Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2010).
155
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 13.
156
Sambur, supra note 149, at 564.
157
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006). Under Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy
Code, there is an exception to dischargeability for debt that
is for: the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that term is
defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934),
any of the State securities laws, or any regulation or order issued under
such Federal or State securities laws; or common law fraud, deceit, or
manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of any security;
and results, before, on, or after the date on which the petition was
filed, from any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in
any Federal or State judicial or administrative proceeding; any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor; or any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary
payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment
owed by the debtor.
Id.
153
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or administrative order or settlement agreement.
The Corporate
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 added this provision
159
of § 523 to the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
In enacting this provision, Congress intended to make judgments and
settlements arising from securities law violations to be non160
dischargeable.
This was done to help defrauded investors recover
their losses by closing a perceived “loophole” in bankruptcy law,
which had allowed wrongdoers to discharge their debt from securities
161
law violations.
Based on the language of this provision, debt owed under Section 954 could fall within this exception and, therefore, could be
non-dischargeable. In order for it to fall within this exception, two
requirements must be met, however. First, courts would have to find
noncompliance with Section 954 to constitute a violation of securities
law. This may be likely because Section 954 has been added to the
162
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as Section 10D. Therefore, there is
a very strong argument that Section 954 falls within the definition of
“securities law” required by § 523 because that definition includes the
163
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Second, the debt owed under
Section 954 would have to be memorialized in a judicial or administrative order or a settlement agreement. This would most likely apply
to actions that the SEC brings against executives and, if courts were to
164
allow private causes of action, it would likely apply to actions against
executives by either the company or shareholders. But it would probably not apply to internal actions within companies. In addition,
there would have to be a showing that the alleged violations actually
occurred. For example, a settlement agreement that does not concede fault or liability on part of the debtor may not satisfy this re165
quirement. If these prerequisites are met and based on the legislative intent behind the exception in § 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy
158

In re Jafari, 401 B.R. 494, 496 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009).
Murley, supra note 145, at 318.
160
S. REP NO. 107-146, at 12 (2002).
161
Id. at 10.
162
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4).
163
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 523.27 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev.
2009 ).
164
While this Comment has argued that private causes of action will most likely
not be permitted under Section 954, there is still the possibility that a court will find
that Section 954 provides individuals with the right to private causes of action.
165
See In re Tills, 419 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).
159
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Code, it seems that debt owed under Section 954 would be nondischargeable. An executive or former executive who is trying to discharge Section 954 debt is attempting to take advantage of the exact
166
“loophole” that Congress wanted to close by enacting § 523(a)(19).
If debt owed under Section 954 was dischargeable, it would frustrate
the policy reasoning for Section 523(a)(19).
167
The second possible exception is found in § 523(a)(4). Under
§ 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, there is an exception to
dischargeability for any debt that is “for fraud or defalcation while
168
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.”
Defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity involves the misappropriation
169
or failure to account for funds.
The federal courts have reached
different interpretations of what constitutes defalcation while acting
in a fiduciary capacity because some disagree about the requisite level
of intent that the fiduciary must have when committing the defalca170
tion for the exception to apply.
One group of circuit courts has
held that negligence or innocent mistake by the fiduciary is enough
171
for the exception to apply.
Another group of circuit courts has
held that there needs to be something more than negligence or mistake on the part of the fiduciary, such as willful negligence or reck172
lessness. A third group of circuit courts has held that extreme recklessness or conscious misbehavior by the fiduciary is required for the
173
exception to apply.
Based on the circuit split over the meaning of defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, it is difficult to determine whether or
not debt owed under Section 954 would be non-dischargeable under
§ 523(a)(4). Depending on which interpretation a court adopts, debt
incurred under Section 954 could fall within the § 523(a)(4) exception. Under the view that only negligence or mistake is required,
debt owed under Section 954 would most likely be nondischargeable. Executive officers owe the same fiduciary duties to the

166

S. REP NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002).
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006).
168
Id.
169
In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002).
170
See generally Matthew W. Knox, Note, Persistent Confusion: The Circuit Split Over
the Exception to Discharge for Defalcation Under 11 USC § 523(a)(4), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1078 (2008) (discussing the circuit split in detail).
171
Id. at 1086–87.
172
Id. at 1091.
173
Id. at 1099.
167
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company and its shareholders as board members do, such as the duty
174
of loyalty and the duty of care.
Therefore, executive officers are
175
acting within a fiduciary capacity. Material noncompliance with the
financial reporting requirements under the securities laws that require a company to prepare an accounting restatement could be considered defalcation because it could be seen as a failure to account
for funds. Under this standard, it would not be necessary to show
that the executive officers intentionally caused the material noncompliance but only that they were negligent in discharging their duties
176
to avoid such noncompliance.
Under the interpretations of the other groups of circuit courts,
however, it may be harder to find that debt owed under Section 954 is
non-dischargeable. For a court to hold a debt dischargeable under
the two alternative interpretations, it would have to find that the executive officer was not merely negligent but rather the officer was
reckless, extremely reckless, or conscious in causing the noncompli177
ance.
If these higher standards were applied, executive officers
would be able to escape liability under Section 954 more easily
through the process of personal bankruptcy.
As between the two exceptions, it seems that the securities law
exception is more suitable for debt owed under Section 954. Based
on the wording of the provision and the legislative intent in enacting
it, a court is more likely to find that this provision applies to debt
owed under Section 954. It seems less likely that a court would find
debt owed under Section 954 to fall under the fiduciary duty exception because of the differing interpretations of when the exception
applies.
V. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE
LIABILITY UNDER THE CLAWBACK PROVISION
Congress had two policy reasons in mind when it included the
178
clawback provision in the Dodd-Frank Act. First, Congress wanted
to deter executives from making high risk decisions that will have
short term gains but will eventually hurt the stability and strength of
174
See Michael Follet, Note, Gantler v. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A Look
at the Current State of Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Advice for Potential Protection, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 563, 575 (2010).
175
Id.
176
Knox, supra note 170, at 1086.
177
Id. at 1091.
178
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136 (2010).
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179

the company.
This provision acts as a deterrent against this risky
behavior by forcing executives to reimburse the company for com180
pensation that is erroneously received. Second, Congress wanted to
promote fairness to shareholders because executives should not be
allowed to keep compensation that is received erroneously when the
181
company would otherwise use the money for other purposes.
If executives are allowed to escape liability under Section 954
through indemnification, D&O liability insurance, or personal bankruptcy, the policy rationale behind the provision will be frustrated.
Executives will not face personal liability for excess compensation
owed under Section 954 and, therefore, will not be deterred from
making high-risk decisions. Instead, either the company or an insurance provider will reimburse the executive, through indemnification
or D&O liability insurance, respectively. In the event that neither indemnification nor D&O insurance is applicable, executive officer
could attempt to discharge the debt incurred under Section 954 in
Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy proceedings. Based on past case law
and statutory interpretation, there are strong arguments against allowing the use of these methods to escape liability under Section 954.
When considering Section 954 liability, courts should follow these
holdings and interpretations, in order to ensure the effectiveness of
Section 954. Also, the “fairness to shareholders” reasoning will not
be served if executives avoid liability in any of these three ways. Under any of these circumstances, the company and its shareholders will
suffer because the company will foot the bill of the executive officer
and not be able to put the money to better use.
Based on the large amount of money that may be at stake, it is
highly likely that executive officers that are required to return com182
pensation under Section 954 will attempt to avoid repayment.
As
more and more companies adopt and implement clawback policies in
183
anticipation of the proposal of rules pursuant to Section 954, there
will likely be an increase in instances in which executives are required
to return certain parts of their compensation. With this increase,

179

Id. (citing THE INVESTOR’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 44).
Id.
181
Id.
182
See supra Part IV.
183
See Erik Krusch, Corporate Governance: Dodd-Frank’s Compensation Tremors,
(Feb.
23,
2011),
http://www.complinet.com/doddCOMPLINET.COM
frank/news/analysis/article/corporate-governance-dodd-franks-compensationtremors.html.
180
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there will be more executives searching for methods to avoid the liability imposed by the clawback policies. Recently, companies and ex184
ecutives have looked for ways to get around other recent reforms,
and Section 954 enforcement will likely be no different. In order for
the enforcement of Section 954 to be fully effective, courts should
not allow executive officers to escape liability under Section 954 by
185
employing these methods. Just as the courts’ interpretations of Section 304 in Jenkins and Cohen allowed enforcement of that provision,
courts should interpret Section 954 to provide for the full enforce186
Based on the similarities in both purpose
ment of its mandates.
and effect between Section 304 and Section 954, courts should apply
the interpretations of Section 304 to the enforcement of Section 954.
While these two sections are not identical, their similarities are significant enough to justify similar enforcement. By applying the prior interpretations of Section 304 to the enforcement of Section 954,
courts will provide for the broadest possible application of the two
sections and ensure their effectiveness going forward. This will allow
Section 954 to have the impact that Congress intended it to have.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the federal government took action to help the economy
recover and to help prevent a similar crisis in the future. As part of
the federal government’s response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Act, which made sweeping reforms to the regulation of the financial
industry. Included within the Dodd-Frank Act was Section 954, which
184
See Eric Dash, Stock-Hedging Lets Bankers Skirt Efforts to Overhaul Pay, N.Y. TIMES:
(Feb.
5,
2011,
5:04
PM),
DEALBOOK
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/stock-hedging-lets-bankers-skirt-effortsto-overhaul-pay.
185
There have been critics of the executive compensation provisions of the DoddFrank Act who have questioned whether the provisions will actually be effective in
preventing future financial crises. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II 25–35 (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research
Paper
No.
10–12,
Sept.
7,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673575. As part of what Professor Bainbridge termed “Quack Federal Corporate Governance,” he criticizes Section 954 as being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive because it reaches innocent
executives but at the same time does not reach other individuals who may pose a risk
to the stability of a company. Id. at 27. Also, the provision may have unintended
consequences, such as companies increasing fixed-salary compensation and decreasing incentive-based compensation. Id.
186
See Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2010); SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F.
Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010).
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mandates that companies listed on the national securities exchanges
develop and implement clawback policies. These policies require executive officers to reimburse the company for incentive-based compensation in certain situations. The clawback provision of the DoddFrank Act has a number of similarities to the clawback provision of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which makes the Sarbanes-Oxley provision
instructive on how the Dodd-Frank provision may be implemented
and enforced. While there are still many open questions as to how
the clawback policies will be implemented and enforced, the congressional intent in enacting Section 954 is clear: to deter risky behavior
by executive officers and to promote fairness to shareholders. In order for these policy goals to be met, executives should not be able to
avoid responsibility for debt incurred under Section 954 through indemnification, D&O insurance, or personal bankruptcy. Thus, courts
should use the interpretations of Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
At as a guide for the implementation of Section 954. These interpretations would allow the courts to thoroughly enforce liability under
Section 954 and would allow Section 954 to have the effect that Congress intended.

